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a double-edged weapon; a contrary intention might have been inferred
from the absence of any explicit provision in this title of the Act.
The Court also relied on economic reasoning to bolster its conclusion.
According to the Court, consolidation of railroads involves savings which
bear most heavily on the interests of labor. If this hardship is not miti-
gated, employee morale will be impaired, danger of disputes increased, and
interruption of transportation rendered more probable. Even granting that
the threat is of sufficient magnitude to overcome objections raised on the
basis of the Railroad Retirement Board case, it is still possible to question
the Commission's authority to deal with a problem normally dealt with by
Congress. After eight years of depression, the harsh effects of railroad
consolidations on labor are not so unforeseeable as to justify Congress in
granting, and the Commission in exercising, such authority on grounds of
emergency. 19 The principal case sanctions a liberal extension of an orig-
inally wide discretion. The conditions here imposed, unlike past Congres-
sional action and contrary to the holding of the Railroad Retirement Board
case, seem only indirectly related to the maintenance of an adequate trans-
portation system. The conditions, however, are not beyond the bounds of
reasonableness. V.K.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW--TUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-
[United States].-The Federal Communications Commission after a hearing
denied a corporation's application for a broadcasting license on the grounds
that the applicant was not financially responsible and that the principal
stockholder was not a resident of the locality in which the station would
operate. As the first ground rested upon a mutual mistake of law and the
Court of Appeals did not deem the second a considered basis for the deci-
sion, on appeal it reversed the decision and remanded the case for further
consideration of the second ground.' Notwithstanding its own regulation to
the effect that it will endeavor to fix the same date for hearing conflicting
claims "excepting, however, applications filed after any such application
has been designated for hearing,"2 the Federal Communications Commission
then set the case for a rehearing together with other conflicting applications
filed subsequent to the setting of the original hearing of the case. The
applicant resorted to the Court of Appeals for writs of prohibition and
mandamus to require the Commission to hear the application separately and
to decide the case upon the previous record. That court granted the writs,
19. Cf. Skrmetta v. Alabama Oyster Comm. (1936) 232 Ala. 371, 168
So. 168; Basalt Rock Co. v. MacMillan (Cal. App. 1926) 251 Pac. 322;
Lloyd v. Ramsay (1921) 192 Iowa 103, 183 N. W. 333; State ex rel. Wiscon-
sin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman (1928) 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929;
Associated Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1936) 221 Wis.
519, 266 N. W. 205.
1. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission(App. D. C. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 288.
2. Rules of Practice, Rule 106.4. This has become sec. 12.21 of the Com-
mission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective January 1, 1939.
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and ruled that the commission was bound by its remanding order on the
previous appeal. 3 On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the court's
action, holding that by making "public interest, convenience, or necessity"
the criterion for the issuance of a license, Congress left such questions of
procedure to the judgment of the commission. 4
Two antagonistic interests here confronted the court-that of the appli-
cant in having effect given to its priority of filing and that of the public
in a determination of conflicting applications on their merits. In deciding
against the applicant the Supreme Court attempted more fully to effectuate
the legislative purpose by refusing to restrict the commission to a set pro-
cedure. The commission, it held, except as limited by statute, is to be free
to determine its procedure so as most efficiently to carry out its function.
Somewhat analogous is the latest Supreme Court phase of the litigation
in United States v. Morgan.5 In that case, which involved an order of the
Secretary of Agriculture prescribing maximum rates to be charged by
market agencies in the Kansas City stockyards, a fund representing the
difference between the rates charged and those prescribed was impounded
pending determination of the controversy. When enforcement of the order
was permanently enjoined because of the Secretary's failure to grant a full
and fair hearing, as conceived by the Court under the statute,6 the Secre-
tary re-opened the original proceeding and served his original findings of
fact, conclusion, and order upon the market agencies, this time with an
opportunity for them to file exceptions and make oral argument upon the
exceptions. The agencies then petitioned the district court for a return of
the money since the order was invalid, arguing that the proceedings should
be terminated because under the Act the Secretary could not, in a proceeding
instituted by himself, make an order for the payment of money.7 That
court ordered the money returned to the agencies, but the Supreme Court
on appeal ruled it must be held pending the Secretary's final determination
of the reasonableness of the rates. The court, having impounded the money
as a court of equity, must distribute it on equitable principles and in doing
so is bound, in accordance with the Act which declares unreasonable rates
to be unlawful, to give full effect to the Secretary's determination, despite
the fact that that determination could not eventuate in an order. The court
and the Secretary should each, in the language of the Supreme Court, act "in
the performance of its prescribed statutory duty" with "regard to the
appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects
3. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission
(App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 36.
4. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.
(1940) 309 U. S. 134.
5. (1939) 307 U. S. 183.
6. Morgan v. United States (1938) 304 U. S. 1, aff'd (1938) 304 U. S. 23.
7. " * * * The Secretary shall have the same power and authority to pro-
ceed with any inquiry instituted upon his own motion as though he had been
appealed to by petition, including the power to make and enforce any order
or orders in the case or related to the matter or thing concerning which
the inquiry is had, except orders for the payment of money." Packers and
Stockyards Act (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 210(c). (Italics supplied.)
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of the statute."8 Thus in each of the foregoing cases courts were compelled
to temper their strict power so as to give effect to administrative discretion.
The courts in general have recognized the expert character of adminis-
trative tribunals intrusted with the efficient regulation of economic processes.
They have on the whole declined to impose their inexpert opinions on the
tribunals' expert ones and have refused to reverse decisions or orders unless
unconstitutional, beyond the statutory authority, or without any substantial
evidence to sustain the supporting findings of fact.9 Recently the courts also
have consistently refused to entertain any proceeding to question an admin-
istrative order until all administrative remedies have been exhaustedO
except where the only question left for determination is one of law and
hence properly presents a judicial issue.1
The instant case illustrates the conflict between the desire for certainty
growing out of a set procedure and a strict adherence to the court's mandate
and the desire to allow an administrative commission to adapt its practice
in a given case to the service of the public interest as envisaged by the com-
mission.12 The decision illustrates a strong present tendency in the Supreme
Court to accept administrative bodies as agencies supreme within their
sphere and entitled to the full exercise of the statutory powers in carrying
out their functions.13
W. B. W.
8. (1939) 307 U. S. 183, at 191.
9. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. (1910) 215
U. S. 452; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pac. R. R. (1912)
222 U. S. 541; Manufacturers Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission(1918) 246 U. S. 457; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States (1920) 254
U. S. 57; Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States (1934) 292
U. S. 282; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States (1937) 300 U. S. 297;
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States (1939) 307 U. S. 125. See also
Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1918) 22 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 275, 4 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 957; Gordon, "Adminis-
trative" Tribunals and the Courts (1933) 49 L. Q. Rev. 94, 419.
10. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 210; Porter v.
Investors Syndicate (1932) 286 U. S. 461; United States v. Illinois Central
R. R. (1934) 291 U. S. 457; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1938)
303 U. S. 41; Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board(C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 97; Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of
Judicial Relief (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 230, 4 Selected Essays on Constitu-
tional Law 940.
11. Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 82 F. (2d)
145.
12. Cf. Bevis, Administrative Commissions and the Administration of
Justice (1928) 2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 1, 21-27, esp. 25, 4 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law 92.
13. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp.(1940) 60 S. Ct. 493. Mr. Justice Stone has likened the rise of administra-
tive law and its reception by the courts and the profession to that of equity
in the seventeenth century. The Common Law in the United States (1936)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 16-18; United States v. Morgan (1939) 307 U. S. 183,
191. This decision is a step away from such an antagonistic reception. Cf.
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1936) 298 U. S. 1.
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